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CAPITAL AND CULTURAL HEGEMONISM: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE »FOREIGN ELEMENT« IN NORWEGIAN SOCIETY

KAPITAL I KULTURNI HEGEMONIZAM: KRATKI HISTORIJSKI PREGLED »STRANOG ELEMENTA« U NORVEŠKOM DRUŠTVU

SAŽETAK

Ovaj rad obrađuje s povijesnog gledišta neke socioekonomske aspekte položaja indigenih Samija (Laponaca) i stranih radnika u Norveškoj. Raspravlja se prvo o implikacijama pojava poput »homogenog društva« a zatim, upotrebom Edward Saidovog pojma »fleksibilne pozicije superiornosti«, analizira se odnos stranaca prema dominantnom norveškom društvu.

Rad posebno pokušava istaknuti kako su u povijesti i danas na razne načine kombinirani ekonomski interesi i hegemonistički stavovi »zapadne« kulture da bi se opravdalo a) proizvoljno određivanje »strane« i »migrantske« kategorije, b) unutrašnja kolonizacija i politika ponorveživanja i c) kontrola i isključenje određenih stranih grupa iz društva.

I. INTRODUCTION: SOME INITIAL PREMISES

Just as the FR of Germany, despite its more than four million foreign workers and dependents, continues to officially proclaim that it is *not* a country of immigration, so Norway, with its indigenous Sami and foreign populations, continues to present itself as a *homogeneous* society:

> Norway, although not ranked at the very top of the list of homogeneous countries, is more or less the first ... on the list of 73 countries regarding the percentage of dominant language speakers ... and one of the countries where practically the whole population is registered as Christian ... Almost all are Lutheran, and 95 percent are members of the State church.
>
> Norway has a marked ethnic dividing line between the Samis and the »Europeans«. However, this dividing line can easily be crossed — at any rate in one direction — and the Samis are so few, that this division in terms of world scale, is completely insignificant.
>
> There exists a lively trade with abroad, but this trade does not allow foreigners to come particularly close to Norwegians ... In 1972 the foreign employment was only 20, 322 or 2 percent.
>
> We can state, that nearly all who live in Norway are Norwegians, and almost all Norwegians live in Norway. The Norwegian state, the Norwegian nation, the Norwegian folk — these are broadly speaking one and the same entity.[1]

[1] Johan Galtung og Nils Peter Gleditsch, »Norge i verdenssamfunnet«, *Det Norske Samfunn*, Bd. 2, eds. Natalie Rogoff Ramsøy og Mariken Vaa, (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1975), p. 756—757.

The following discussion will attempt to illustrate: a) that the implications of concepts such as »not a country of immigration« or »homogeneous society« are neither as neutral, nor as divergent, as they might at first appear — rather, they are used as rationalizations for legitimizing concrete policies vis-à-vis certain groups; b) how this concept of »homogeneous society« has been applied, historically and actually, to the indigenous and foreign populations in Norway.

The notion of »homogeneous society : »Us« versus »They«

The term »homogeneous society« carries many value assumptions, which pervade the civil and political society[2], and become rather significant when placed into a comparative framework.

> The very logic of emphasizing sameness, implicitly or explicitly, requires a comparison with that which is different. However, the act of defining difference is problematic in and of itself.

1) arbitrariness and cultural hegemony

> There is always a measure of the purely arbitrary in the way distinctions between things are seen ... If we agree that all things in history, like history itself, are made by men, then we will appreciate how possible it is for many objects or places or times to be assigned roles and given meanings that acquire *objective validity* only *after* the assignments are made. This is especially true of relatively uncommon things like *foreigners, mutants* or *»abnormal behaviour«*.[3]

The subsequent relationship between these arbitrary distinctions has been reinforced in practice by a culturally hegemonistic idea of Europe, that is, »a collective notion identifying 'us' Europeans against all 'those' non-Europeans«.[4] As Edward Said points out, this collective notion »is an indispensable concept for any understanding of cultural life in the industrial West«, for it is understood by this Europocentric idea »that the 'normal man' is the European man of the historical period, that is since Greek antiquity«.[5]

> There exist, of course, finer hierarchical gradations of »us« and »they« even within this collective notion of Europe, e.g. Northern — Southern Europe. In Norway, the expression, 'the countries it is natural to compare ourselves with' plays an important role in motivating proposals, both official and private ... Norway compares herself with that which is near, rich, Western, and first and foremost, Germanic. The rest of the world, especially the socialist and developing countries (Italy included) would seem to serve to some extent as a 'negative reference group'.[6]

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2 This section of the paper is based on concepts developed by Edward Said in his analysis of Orientalism, which is the system of European or Western knowledge about the Orient, i.e. European dominantion of the Orient. Terms such as »flexible positional superiority« and »latent inferiority« are Said's terms, while the notion of civil and political society are Gramsci's analytical distinctions, as used in Said's work.

Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York:, Vintage Books, 1979).

3 Edward Said, ibid. p 54.

4 ibid., p. 7.

5 Anwar Abdel Malek, cited in Said, p. 97.

6 Johan Galtung, »Norway in the World Community«, *Norwegian Society*, ed. Natalie Rogoff Ramsoy, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1974), p. 386.

2) **positional superiority: the utilization of subsequent arbitrary relationships**

> Can one divide human reality, as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races, and survive the consequences humanly? By surviving the consequences humanly, I mean to ask whether there is any way of avoiding the *hostility* expressed in the division, say of men into »us« and »they«. For such divisions are generalities, whose use historically and actually have been to press the importance of the distinctions between some men and some *other* men, usually not towards especially admirable ends.[7]

The mechanism or strategy behind the division of »us« and »they« is that of »flexible positional superiority, which encompasses a whole series of possible relationships (economic, political, socio-cultural), without »us« ever losing the upper hand«.[8], The corresponding opposite of positional superiority can perhaps best be described as »latent inferiority«, which is reinforced in majority-minority relationships.

a) Minority status is not reducible to a specific form of exploitation in the production process. It has *historical, cultural,* and *ideological dimensions of* its own.[9]

Historically, European cultural and colonial hegemonism has manifested itself in such forms as the forced »migration« of more than 10 million slaves across the Atlantic. Colonialism and the trade in human beings a) economically provided vital flows of commodities and capital supporting the Industrial Revolution, b) ideologically was rationalized by racism.[10] Racism is a special kind of divisive and inegalitarian ideology of domination, based on the concept of biologically determined superiority of one human population, group or race over the other.[11]

Colonialism and the history and ideologies of racism have been influential even in countries that were not major colonial powers, for »it must be remembered that ethnocentric attitudes are deeply rooted in Western European culture«.[12] In Norway, the arbitrary distinctions set up between the indigenous Sami and the dominant Norwegian society, developed into an internal colonialism based on national, political, and economic interests. These interests, in turn, were reinforced by cultural hegemonism, and rationalized by racist Social Darwinist ideas.

It must be remembered that majority-minority relationships are *not* quantitative in nature; e.g. the white minority rules over the black majority in South Africa, *through* an apartheid system. Thus, statements such as »the Samis (or migrants) are so few, therefore insignificant« use implicit ethnocentric arguments, couched in a »scientific logic« of numbers to legitimize political and economic positional superiority over a minority group.

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7 Edward Said, ibid., p. 45.

8 Edward Said, ibid., p. 7.

9 Stephen Castles, Heather Booth and Tina Wallace, *Here for Good — Western Europe's New Ethnic Minorities,* (London, Pluto Press, 1984), p. 98.

10 Amiya Kumar Bagchi, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment* (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983), p. 43.

11 Bagchi's and Castles definition, ibid.

12 Castles, ibid. p. 195—196.

b) Becoming a minority is a process whereby dominant groups in society ascribe certain (real or imagined) characteristics to the newcomers, and use these to justify assignments of specific economic, social and political roles.[13]

Foreign workers are in a minority situation *vis-à-vis* the »flexible positional superiority« of the receiving society. As Samir Amin points out, »migrants come into a receiving society that is already organized and structured. The functions they fulfill, depend on that system, and change to adapt to the needs of the system«.[14]

In post-war European labour migrations, foreign workers were »imported« and primarily »compelled to enter the labour market at the lowest levels ... because that is where the capitalist economy needed them«.[15] They were primarily employed either in jobs for which indigenous labour was »unavailable«; or in branches of industry which were in the process of restructuring, as part of the world-wide reorganization of production (the new international division of labour).[16] Thus, one of the functions that the migrants fulfilled within the system was the »creation of preconditions for a new shift in the labour process«.[17]

As the whole economic system began to shift in the mid-1960's towards globally integrated production, plant closings, diminished industrial output and structural unemployment began to manifest themselves in the »deindustrializing« European receiving countries.[18] This has increasingly placed national states in a conflicting relationship between international capital and national socio-economic goals, e.g. the crisis of the welfare state.

The position of the migrant workers, which has changed to that of settled minorities, has grown more untenable, as the general outlook has moved »from expansion and optimism to stagnation and crisis«.[19] Even migration models have reflected this change — in the 1950's, dualistic models presented migration as a positive factor in providing labour for industrialization; in the 1970's, neo-classical models portray migration as negative and contributing to urban unemployment.[20]

On the one hand, foreign workers are used to reduce the political and social strains of the state in crisis, by cushioning, to a certain degree, national workers from unemployment (in all receiving countries there is a higher unemployment rate among immigrants than among the domestic labour force).[21] On

13 Castles, ibid. p. 96.
14 Samir Amin, *Modern Migrations in Western Africa* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1974), p. 66.
15 Castles, ibid., p. 157.
16 For a discussion of the »new international division of labour« see Folker Fröel, Jürgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye, *The New International Division of Labour* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980), and *Capital and Labour* in *the Urbanized World,* ed. John Walton, SAGE Studies in International Sociology, Volume 31, 1985.
17 Castles, ibid., p. 157.
18 As part of this »new« or »third« international division of labour, parts of the industrial production are being exported from the center to the periphery, especially the Third World. »It is characterized by the strategy of transnational organizations exploiting the most profitable conditions of production for the different elements of a fragmented productive process.« (Dieter Läpple, »Internationalization of Capital and the Regional Problem«) in John Walton, ibid. Läpple points out for example, that between 1965 and 1974, the number of jobs in the textile and clothing industry in the Common Market decreased by about 762,000. In 1970 the share of Third World countries in world employment for this branch was nearly 51 percent. (p. 73, footnote). Another example is Sao Paolo, called »the greatest 'German' industrial city«, with more than 250,000 direct and 500,000 indirect »German« jobs (that is, jobs in the factories of Volkswagen, Mercedes, Krupp, etc. and of their Brazilian sub-contractors). ibid. p. 48.
19 Castles, ibid., p. 194.
20 Peter Peek and Guy Standing, »State Policies and Labour Migration,« *State Policies and Migration,* eds. P. Peek and Guy Standing (London: Croom Helm, 1982), footnote, p. 5.
21 SOPEMI, 1979, cited in Carl-Ulrik Schierup, »The Immigrants and Crisis«, *Acta Sociologica,* 1985 (28), 1:21—33.

the other hand, the significantly higher unemployment rate among foreign workers is placed within a confrontational perspective *vis-à-vis* the dominant receiving societies: they are not only blamed for the crisis; they are also the social and economic burden which is »threatening« the overextended welfare state, thereby endangering the stability of the status quo.

To this end, cultural differences become a »front which first separates, then invites control, containment or domination (through »superior« knowledge and accomodating power) of the Other«.[22] From the beginning, the foreign workers« disadvantaged position on the labour market, together with the curtailment of their social and political rights contributed to labelling them as »latently inferior«. However, as the crisis has worsened, the »us« — »they« distinctions have grown increasingly hostile. Ideological offensives such as racism have taken on a new social significance as a popular explanation for the decline, while the shape and structure of racism itself has changed from the 1960's, (from exploitation to repatriation).[23] Old Nazi ideas of the innate superiority of the white »Germanic« or »Nordic« race are invoked, together with arguments of European cultural hegemonism which are manifested in a growing emphasis on the *cultural distinctiveness* of each nation. This new racism attributes barriers between people to human nature and claims that »natural« urges to maintain one's own group or nation and to exclude aliens make integration or multicultural existence impossible:

> Apparently it is not permissible ... to become conscious of the fact that there are *various degrees* of being alien and that for *natural reasons* (or more precisely *cultural reasons*) coexistence is most difficult with the *particular* alien. Matters are reasonably good with the eastern, southern and south-eastern Europeans. Even a few Italian mafiosi can be coped with. This is not surprising, for ever since the period of historical migration of peoples, the interchange between Slav, Romanic and also Celtic peoples has become a habit. A tacit *we-feeling* has arisen in *one and the same European culture.* But *excluded* from this are the Turk peoples, and also the Palestinians, North Africans and *others* from totally alien cultures. *They* and *only they* are the foreigner problem.[24]

While the above citation refers to the Federal Republic of Germany, it is equally applicable in the Norwegian case. Through a *selective* process of exclusion (non-white, non Christian) concepts such as »not a country of immigration« and »homogeneous society« converge. Arbitrary »us« — »they« distinctions become utilized for not especially admirable ends, and racism »which is a daily reality to members of the new foreign minorities throughout Western Europe, makes nonsense of all ideologies of equal rights or opportunities«.[25]

The following parts of the discussion will attempt to elaborate and illustrate the ideas presented in this section more thoroughly, by reference to particular examples from the Norwegian case.

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[22] Edward Said, ibid., pp. 47—48.

[23] A. Sivanandan, »Challenging Racism- A Strategy for the 1980's,« *Searchlight*, May 1983, no. 95, pp. 17—18.

[24] Stephen Castles, »Racism and Politics in West Germany,« *Race and Class*, Vol. XXV (3), 1984, p. 46.

[25] Castles, *Here for Good*, ibid., p. 193.

II. INTERNAL COLONIALISM

> Imaginative geography of the »our land-barbarian land« variety does not require that the »barbarians« acknowledge the distinction. It is enough for »us« to set up these boundaries in our minds; »they« become »they« accordingly, and both their territory and mentality are designated as different from »ours«.[26]

The Sami people are the oldest minority in the Nordic countries, and their history is in many ways analogous to that of the native American populations. The distinctions set up between the Sami and the dominant Norwegian society developed into an internal colonialism which controlled, contained and dominated the Samis, through the destruction of their socio-economic and cultural institutions. The expansion of capital interests, e.g. mining, together with national security interests, legitimized a culturally hegemonistic policy of *Norwegianization* which incorporated and marginalized both the Sami and the Finnish settlers in northern Norway.

The foundations for the administration and colonialization of the Sami lands were laid already in the 1600's. From an economic standpoint, it was believed that the coast of Finnmark (the most northern province in Norway) could be used for colonialist endeavours, through the control of the northern trade routes to Russia and the Far East. To this end, a British expedition in 1553 made initial explorations in Finnmark, searching for a northern sea route to China and India.[27] Concurrently, the »civilizing« process of the Samis, who »could not easily take to a higher Civilization« and were »little qualified for abstract Reflection« was effected through coercive missionary activity. Among other things, this »civilizing« process included lashings and being burned alive as punishments for use of Sami socio-religious artifacts.[28]

The policy of Norwegianization — »the cultural hegemonism of possessing minorities«[29]

Colonial and cultural domination reached a highpoint in the 1850's, when the policy of *Norwegianization* began to be systematically practiced. The enforcement and implementation of this policy was done through the co-ordinated activities of the Church and School Administration. *Norwegianization* meant the complete renouncement of anything that had to do with Sami culture, with the aim of their becoming, as quickly as possible, *like the Norwegians*. In 1880, it was decreed that Sami (a Finno-Ugric language) should be removed from all school teaching, with the possible exception of Christian instruction. According to the authorities, it was »clear that nothing worthy will come from the Lappish population, until Norwegian is the only language used in the home and the shool«.[30]

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26 Edward Said, ibid., p. 54. As Said points out, »Ideas (and their authors) emerge out of complex and historical circumstances. One of them is the culturally sanctioned habit of deploying large generalizations by which reality is divided into various collectives: languages, races, types, colors, mentalities, each category being not so much a neutral designation as an *evaluative interpretation*. Underlying these categories is the rigidly binomial opposition of »ours« and »theirs«, with the former always encroaching upon the latter (even to the point of *making »theirs« exclusively a function of »ours«*) (p. 227).

27 Einhart Lorenz, *Samefolket i historien* (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1981), p. 32.

28 Einhart, Lorenz, ibid.

29 Anwar Abdel Malek's term, cited in Said.

30 Leif Eriksen, »Fornorskningspolitikken i skolen 1850—1910,« *Pedagogen*, nr. 3, 1979, p. 6.

a) Capital interests

This policy of »Norwegianization« coincided with the growth of capital interests, especially mining operations, which made the Sami regions economically significant. Mining operations, which started in 1826 with the opening of a British copper mine in Alta, significantly grew towards the end of the nineteenth century. The Sulitjelma mines, called »Lappland's hell« by the workers, had the largest workforce in all of Norway at the time, while British, German and Canadian operations employed thousands of workers during the summer seasons.[31]

b) National security and »The Foreign Element«

National security interests involved the Sami population, but were more directly aimed at the Kvens — Finnish settlers who had migrated in the 18th——19th centuries predominantly to the northern part of the country around Finnmark and Nord-Troms. In the 1860's, there were growing fears in Norway of possible expansionist policies from Finland, which was at the time a Russian grand duchy. The »danger from the east«, as it came to be called, concerned possible territorial claims by Finland on the provinces of Finnmark and Nord--Troms, due to the heavy concentration of Finnish settlers there.

In 1868, the Parliament protocol committee took up the question of the Finnish immigrants and proclaimed them »unreliable, untrustworthy and a security risk«.[32] As a result, in the »interests« of national security, *both* the Finns *and* the Samis were declared »the foreign element«. Subsequently, the Finns, along with the Samis, were incorporated into the program of *Norwegianization.* The banning of Finnish, along with the Sami language, in schools and daily life, was accompanied by a series of judicial, residential and land regulations which socially and economically further marginalized the two minorities.

The strategy of »Norwegianization« included an actual resettlement prograf of Norwegians from the south of the country to the border reginos of Finnmark. In the process, the Sami population was a) physically displaced — in 1845, over half of the population of Finnmark was Sami; by 1900 the Norwegian population had increased to 55 percent, while the Samis fell below 30 percent; b) their economic subsistence, already undermined through enclosures of reindeer grazing lands and mining operations, became more tenuous.[33]

In 1902, state regulations concerning the sale of land in Finmark excluded both the Samis and the Finns from becoming agriculturalists, by stipulating that purchases could only be made by Norwegian citizens, who read, wrote and spoke Norwegian. The Finns, who had been an important labour source in the mines were further excluded, when Parliament in 1903 requested mining companies to hire only Swedes and Norwegians.[34]

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31 Einhart Lorenz, ibid., pp. 73—74.
32 Ragnhild Enoksen, »Finnene- en fare for Norge?«, *Immigranten,* Nr. 3, 1934, p. 11. 13.
Said points out that the »East« has always signified danger and threat, even as it has meant the traditional Orient as well as Russia.
33 Einhart Lorenz, ibid., p. 70.
34 Ragnhild Enoksen, ibid., p. 12.

c) Ideological offensives against the Sami and Finnish minorities

By the 1930's, growing fears of Finnish expansionist policies surfaced again. The Samis and the Finns were both considered to be a potential »fifth column«[35] in the case of an eventual conflict. These views reached a highpoint in 1936, with the publication of »Finnish Danger for Finnmark«, which advocated racial views and solutions similar to those used in the Nazi progroms.

The culmination of these racist views had their origin in the 19th century, when Social Darwinist ideas first appeared in Norway. Social Darwinism hinged on the racist premise of dividing people into superior and inferior races; advanced and primitive cultures. It provided a legitimizing ideology for the policy of *Norwegianization* through the following argumentation:

The traditional conflicting division between »wanderers« and »settled« populations

According to the logic of Social Darwinism, the Samis were by nature (genetically) »nomadic«. This placed their culture on a more primitive level *vis-à-vis the settled* (agricultural) populations. Therefore, it was not in the state's interest to support them over the »higher« civilization[36] — thereby legitimizing the sale of land only to Norwegian settlers.

National conflicts between neighbouring states

Conflicts between the border states created a fear that the minority groups could be used to achieve foreign territorial demands. Therefore, it was »they«, the minorities, which were *threatening* the security of the state. Thus, it was the »foreign element« which had to be controlled and dominated (through »superior« knowledge and accomodating power).

Philological arguments

Social Darwinism was influenced by the natural sciences in the effort »to reduce social phenomena to a 'flatness', which exposed characteristics easily to scrutiny, thus removing it from complicating humanity«.[37] To this end, the attempt to completely eliminate Finnish and Sami from all spheres of life was connected »to the ideological tenets of philology itself, (which) encourages the reduction of a language to its roots—thereafter, the philologist finds it possible to connect these linguistic roots to race, mind, character and temperament«.[38] Thus, the elimination of Sami and Finnish attempted to serve a dual purpose: it reinforced the cultural and positional superiority of the dominant group while striving to do away with »foreign, mutant or abnormal behaviour of the Other.«

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35 Espen Thorud, *Norks Innvandringspolitik og Arbeiderbevegelsen: Fra Apne Dorer til Innvandringsstopp*, Magistergrad i statsvitenskap, Univ. i Oslo, Var, 1985, p. 98.

36 Einhart Lorenz, ibid. pp. 77—79.

»The whole question of imperialism, as it was debated in the late nineteenth century by pro-imperialists and antiimperialists alike, carried forward the binary typology of advanced and backward (or subject) races, cultures, and societies.« (Said, p. 206).

37 Einhart Lorenz, ibid.

38 Said, ibid., p. 150.

The Sami language even today has a low status. School instruction in Sami and Finnish actually began only in the 1970's, despite school laws of 1959 and 1969, which technically allowed teaching to be carried out in these languages. (K. Eira, »Samisk begynneropplaering«, *Pedagogen*, nr. 3, 1979, p. 33).

III. LABOUR MIGRATIONS AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN THE EARLY 1900'S

From the mid-19th century to the beginning of the 1900's, the development of agrarian capitalism and the growth of industrialization significantly affected labour migrations to and from Norway. In general, the development of agrarian capitalism accounted to a significant degree for the trans-Atlantic migrations from Europe to North America in the nineteenth century.[39] In Norway, by the mid 1800's, agrarian capitalism was creating a massive »surplus« population of landless and poor peasants:

> While the number of landowners rose by only 27 percent between 1801 and 1865, the number of cottagers doubled and the number of landless labourers tripled.
>
> The agricultural landless and near-landless group formed about one-quarter of the population. (Their« conditions were wretched and aggravated by rising rents.[40]

The subdivision of land, together with population growth in the absence of significant expansion of employment opportunities, contributed to the emigration of approximately 800,000 Norwegians, between 1865 and 1930. Taking into account that the total population in the mid-1800's consisted of 1.7 million inhabitants, Norway, with the exception of Ireland, had one of the highest rates of emigration in Europe during this period.

Norwegian industrialization, which started only in the 1850's, began to develop more rapidly towards the end of the nineteenth century (the number of industrial workers increased from 12,000 in 1850 to 76,000 in 1900).[41] Correspondingly, a large Swedish labour migration, which peaked in the early 1900's, occurred into the southeastern part of the country (Ostlandet). By 1910, 75 percent of the foreign workers in Norway were Swedish citizens, employed predominantly in construction, shipyards, stone quarries, sawmills and agriculture.

Immigration policies — »Norway for Norwegians«

The period preceding and including the 1920's was increasingly marked by economic stagnation, high unemployment and labour conflicts in Norway. The debate concerning the foreign labour issue, especially from 1915 onwards, revolved around labour-protectionist, socio-cultural and nationalistic arguments,[42] which became increasingly interlinked with the prevalent racehygiene theories of the time. The »flexible positional superiority« of the receiving society incorporated all these arguments in a directed attempt to control *and* exclude the »foreign element«.

The nationalistic arguments directed against the Samis and Finns in the North also manifested themselves in chauvinistic reactions aggainst the Swedish foreign workers. After the dissolution of the union with Sweden in 1905, the Swedes continued to be viewed as a »threat«, albeit within the framenwork of a contracting labour market. To this end, the Swedish foreign workers were increa-

39 Samir Amin, ibid.
40 Irma Adelman and C. Taft Morris, »Growth and Impoverishment in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century,« *World Development*, 1978, vol. 6, no. 3, p. 253.
41 Espen Thorud, ibid. Figures taken from chapter 4, »Streiftog i norsk historie.«
42/45 ibid.

singly presented as »asocial, criminal, and in general, destructive elements within the society«.[43]

These nationalistic arguments involved broader political issues. Within the general unstable economic climate, certain groups (e.g. the Norwegian Party of the Right) directed attention to foreign workers as competitors on the labour and housing market, in an attempt to control growing labour unrest. The Norwegian Labour Party, which was quite radicalized and a member of Comintern (1919—1923), argued on the other hand, that the policy directed against the foreigners was an attempt to rid the country of undesirable, radical elements, both among the Norwegian intellectuals and the foreign workers.[44]

In 1915, modifications were made in the earlier 1901 Aliens Law which a) restricted possibilities for foreigners to settle in most of the larger towns in Norway, and b) incorporated a strong exclusion policy, making certain »wandering« groups, e.g. Jews and Gypsies, »less welcome than *others*«.[45] In effect, these laws were analogous to Nazi Germany's race laws which defined members of minorities as no longer belonging to the *Volk* (people) and thus depriving groups like Jews and Gypsies of citizenship and all civil and human rights. The Gypsies, for example, had their Norwegian citizenship revoked in 1910, and were denied entrance into the country in the 1930's.[46]

Racial biological ideas were thus used »to press the importance of the distinctions between some men and some Other men«. In the 1930's articles appeared with regard to these »wandering groups«, in which the »merits« of internment or sterilization were debated. Between 1942 and 1943, most of the Gypsies in Norway were arrested and sent to concentration camps in Buchenwald, Montreuil-Bellay and Malines[47] — places where the mass murder of »racial« and other »undesirable« groups occurred. The law was changed in 1956, when it was »seen as incorrect to have a provision in the Aliens'Law, which could be interpreted as racially discriminatory«.[48]

IV. POST-WAR LABOUR MIGRATIONS TO NORWAY

Foreign labour migrations to Norway followed the general trends, practices and policies, together with the structural socio-economic discrimination inherent in post-war European labour migrations. The immigration stop which occurred in 1975: a) coincided with the growth of Norwegian oil activity and foreign multinational interests in the North Sea; b) was based on implicit cultural hegemonistic arguments directed at particular foreign groups.

a) The definition of »foreign worker«: »us« versus »they«

Both in mainland Norway and in the off-shore Norwegian oil activities, the very definition of »foreign worker« or »migrant« has functioned on the premise of exclusion/inclusion of certain groups. In 1982, foreign citizens made up 2.1 percent of the total Norwegian population (an increase from 0.4% in 1950).[49] Approximately 95 percent of the foreigners in 1960 (84% in 1976) came from North America or northern Europe, e.g. Great Britian, Sweden, Denmark, Germany — in other words, from countries which are either »natural for Norway to

[46] Ted Hanisch, *Om Siggynersporsmålet: En undersøkelse av bakgrunnen for sosial konfrontasjon* (Oslo: Institutt for Samfunnsforskning, 1976).
[47] ibid., p. 62.
[48] ibid., p. 66.
[49] KAD statistics, cited in Espen Thorud.

compare herself with« and/or fit into the collective notion of Europe. These foreign citizens were classified under categories such as »experts«, and did not fall within the general rubric of »migrant« worker. The term migrant worker (with its connotations) was and continues to be applied to the foreigners from the developing countries — predominantly the Pakistani, but also including Turkish, North African and southeastern European workers.

The migrant workers were predominantly concentrated in the southeastern part of the country (in centers like Oslo). The functions they fulfilled within the Norwegian economic system, as in the rest of Europe, was to fill low-status and low-paid jobs. According to a study carried out in Oslo, one out of every five migrants was employed in the hotel-restaurant sector performing manual labour (serving, cleaning, washing).[50] The hotel and restaurant sector continued to absorb migrants from industries which in the late 1960's and early 1970's were either in the process of carrying out rationalization measures or shutting down (e.g. glass, paper mills). By 1983, however, between 10—15 percent of the foreign labour force in Oslo was unemployed as compared to 2.4 percent of the Norwegian work force.[51]

Trade unions, which have always declared internationalism as one of their basic principles, have actually done little to promote equality and solidarity between immigrants and native workers. It is a significant fact, in and of itself, that the national organization of trade unions in Norway (LO) does *not* know how many migrant workers are actually organized within (LO).[52]

The problems that migrants encounter with the trade unions are many, but they certainly cannot be reduced to their »lack of knowledge« of the functioning of the modern welfare state — an attitude with implicit »latent inferiority« overtones, expressed even in official reports. In Norway, the foreign workers have not been particularly active, even when organized into trade unions, due to the prevalent feeling throughout Europe, that the »unions are organizations of native workers, controlled by them, and representing them«.[53] Trade unions have been slow to act on behalf of migrants, in cases where they have been unjustly treated by maganement; and instead of opposing discriminatory legislation, have practiced it themselves on occasion: cases have been cited in Norwegian concerns, ranging from unions having prevented the employment of foreigners to separate toilets for migrant workers.[54] In 1973, the Confederation of Trade Unions supported the proposal for a temporary migration ban.

b) **The immigration stop of 1775**

Since in Norway, »the expression, 'the countries it is natural to compare ourselves with' plays an important role in motivating proposals«, it is worthwhile to briefly consider the reasons motivating the ban on immigration in the FR of Germany. One of the underlying causes for the migration stop in the FRG was the growing militancy of foreign workers, especially after the 1973 Ford motor works strike in Cologne, led primarily by Turkish production line workers.[55] As Castles points out, the DGBC (analogous to LO in Norway) already in 1972 called for a ban on the further recruitment of foreign workers, *ostensibly because of lack of social infrastructure.* However, the DGB's strong support of the ban was

50 »Innvandrere er overrepresentert blant ledige,« *Arbeiderbladet,* 30. VIII. 1983.
51 ibid.
52 »Ingen konkrete planer mot rasisme,« *Immigranten,* nr. 3, 1983, p. 16.
53 Castles, ibid., p. 154.
54 »Black Workers and Trade Unions,« *Immigranten,* nr. 3, 1983, p. 21.
55/56 Castles, 1984, ibid., cf. chapter entitled »Minorities in the Labour Force.«

motivated by *fears of losing control* over the foreign workers, who threatened to form separate unions.[56] The overall legitimation for the ban was provided by the excuse of the oil crisis.

Norway had neither militant foreign workers (in any case, regulations forbidding employers to hire foreign labour exceeding 25 percent of the total labour force would serve to inhibit potential militancy), nor the excuse of the oil crisis. In fact, one of the dramatic differences the discovery of oil in the North Sea made, was that Norway alone among the Western industrial countries, could aim for, and to a large extent achieve, a high level of economic growth during the world wide recession of the 1970's.[57] In 1974:

— Norwegian GNP grew by over 5 percent;
— the Norwegian Finance Ministry introduced an expansionary budget increasing social security benefits and providing for a growth in real disposable incomes;
— the fast rate of economic growth was accompanied by an exceedingly low unemployment rate of 1.1 percent (Aug. 1973).[58]

However, already in 1972, the Department of Justice proposed a change in the 1956 law concerning the entry of foreigners into Norway:

> It is not expedient to demand work permits for each foreigner working or economically engaged on Norwegian soil. This concerns in particular, *foreigners engaged and paid by foreign employers,* who are not established in Norway. Business has increasing need for international *experts* who travel from land to land to mount, control and repair equipment, give information on the use of it. This development is expected to increase rapidly in connection with the extraction and exploitation of future oil finds.[59]

This proposal, endorsed by the Department of Labour, became law in February 1974. Accordingly, dispensations were granted to the employees of foreign firms from the usual restrictions applied to migrant workers.

This law was very significant, since it changed the *structural* nature of labour migrations *to Norway:*

1) Oil and gas production, overall planning, co-ordination in the multinational-dominated oil industry is carried out through a complicated network of firms. These are staffed by a mixture of *experts* and skilled workers (who follow their firms around the world) *and* by a large number of *unskilled labourers,* personally recruited by these firms. Thus, with the enaction of this law, a) sanctions were given to »group imports« of foreign workers, personally recruited by the oil companies; b) a category of »non-migrant« migrant workers was created.[60]

2) The creation of the »non-migrant« migrant category served a dual purpose: it allowed for the import of migrant workers necessary for the building up of the oil industry, while absolving the Norwegian authorities from any obligations toward these foreign workers:

57/58 »Norway«, *The Economist Survey,* Nov. 15, 1975.

59 Carolyn Swetland, »Norway's Oil and Migrant Workers,« Fremmedarbeiderforeningen (FAF), 1974, (mimeo.), pp. 11—12.

60 Carolyn Swetland, ibid.

> It must surely be accepted that it is in practice a question of work that is only available to firms from other industrialized countries, and that such firms will bring their own work force with them. These employees, *do not,* however, become connected with Norway in such a way, that it is reasonable to regard them as immigrants, *with all the rights that this would imply.*[61]

Thus, Norway's economic interests coincided with the interests of multinational capital, which was indeed influenced by the heavy dependence on foreign expertise in the oil sector. At a time when the need for labour was estimated to increase drastically in the oil sector, the number of work contacts granted to migrants in mainland Norway was steadily decreasing.[62] While the actual circumstances differed, the line of reasoning for the immigration ban in Norway was analogous to the FR of Germany's: a policy of increased immigration would not be carried out, *ostensibly due to lack of infrastructure* (specifically housing). Furthermore, it was pointed out that:

> It is difficult to provide workers with working and living conditions *equal* to those of Norwegian workers. Increased immigration will, therefore, *lead to social problems.*[63]

In both cases, the presentation of foreign workers as a *problem,* which subsequently demands *control,* was reinforced by a range of culturally hegemonistic arguments.

»East of the dividing line«

By 1973, foreign workers from developing countries were not only increasing in number, but were becoming more »visible« in centers like Oslo. The emphasis on the »exotic« distinctiveness of the migrants' culture and Islamic religion was juxtaposed with the image of their being a socio-economic problem. While »there is nothing especially controversial or reprehensible about the domestication of the exotic«[64], this particular juxtaposition placed the migrants in a »confrontational« framework *vis-à-vis* the dominant society. To this end, immigration politics subtly shifted from the general to the specific level and became increasingly associated with »Pakistani politics«.[65]

In this regard, Said's analysis of Orientalism is a useful concept in trying to understand the ideology behind the term »Pakistani politics«:

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61 Ole Kristian Hjemdal, et. al., »National Report of Norway,« *The Role of Information in the Realization of the Human Rights of Migrant Workers,* ed. Taisto Hujanen, University of Tampere, Finland, 12/1984, Series B, pp. 209.

62 Carolyn Swetland, ibid. According to the estimates presented in the White Paper on Oil, »In 1974, approximately 15,000 workers will be employed in oil activities . . . by 1980, this will increase to 20,000—25,000.«

In the first seven months of 1974, 5,800 migrants were granted work permits (2,650 fewer than in the corresponding period of the preceding year (pp. 10—25).

63 Carolyn Swetland, ibid., p. 10.

64 Said, p. 64.

65 Aud Korbøl, »Norsk Innvandringspolitikk-norsk Pakistanerpolitikk?« *Sosiologi i dag,* nr. 2, 1977, pp. 19—32.

> Orientalism, while generally denoting the distant and the exotic ... is also a general group of ideas shot through with doctrines of European superiority, various kinds of racism, imperialism and dogmatic views about the 'Oriental' as a kind of ideal and unchanging abstraction.[66]

Both the study of the Orient, and particularly the examination of the »exotic« migrant is »something *more* than what appears to be positive knowledge, producing an ignorant but complex European understanding of the subject matter.«[67] Moreover, Europe's historical relationships with the Orient is analogous to the migrants' minority situation in the receiving society: the »flexible positional superiority« of both the West in general, and the receiving society specifically, has allowed »a whole series of possible relationships with the Other, without 'us' ever losing the upper hand.«

The very designation of something as Oriental involved (and continues to involve) an already pronounced *evaluative judgment* (Said, p.207): »Orientals were rarely seen or looked at, they were seen through, analyzed not as citizens, or even people, but as *problems* to be solved or confined.«[68] Thus, the argumentation that the migrant is a foreign element which a) creates problems and is, therefore, b) a danger or threat which must be controlled, has historical parallels in Europe's relationship to the Orient. More significant, however, is the fact that a whole range of these historical, cultural and ideological dimensions are used today to control and reinforce the minority status of the foreign workers:

1) **»us« versus »they«**

Western cultural and colonial hegemonism created a dividing line betyeen East and West, which put the Orient »culturally, intellectually and spiritually outside Europe and European civilization«[69], while the European encounter with Islam turned Islam into the very epitome of the *outsider* against which the whole of European civilization from the Middle Ages on was founded (Said, p. 70).

Within this division, the Outsiders' Mohammad becomes an »impostor«, while *rationality* is undermined by Eastern excesses, those mysteriously attractive opposites to what seem to be normal values« (Said, p.57). Thus, the Westerner is »rational, peaceful, logical, capable of holding real values, while the Other is none of the above« (ibid., p. 49). Therefore, within the framework of »Pakistani politics«, it was logically the Pakistanis (and other exotics«) »who were pressing on the borders of the country, breaking the rules, coming with false passports, and in general, creating large *problems* for us.«[70]

66/67 Said, ibid. p. 8,55.

According to Said, »almost from earliest times in Europe the Orient was something more than what was empirically known about it, and certain associations with the East-not quite ignorant, not quite informed always seem to have gathered around the notion of the Orient.« (p. 55).

68 Ibid,. p. 207.

The examination of the Orient and the Oriental, which was »based not simply on empirical reality but also governed by a battery of desires, repressions and projections«, went hand in hand with colonial domination and administration of the Orient.

69 Ibid., p. 70.

»Along with all other peoples variously designated as backward, degenerate, uncivilized and retarded, the Orientals were viewed in a framework constructed out of biological determinism and moral-political admonishment.« If anything, the Oriental was linked to elements in Western society such as delinquents, the insane, women and the poor, »having in common an identity best described as lamentably *alien*« (p. 207).

70 Aud Korbøl, ibid., pp. 26—27.

2) **Subsequent use of the arbitrary relationship**

Cultural differences, once again, become a »front« which first separates, then invites control or containment:

> For Europe, Islam was a lasting trauma ... representing for a whole of Christian civilization a constant danger. In time, European civilization incorporated that peril and its lore, virtues and vices, as something woven into the fabric of life. The European representation of the Muslim, Ottoman, or Arab was always a way of *controlling* the redoubtable Orient.[71]

Norway's fears of being 'swamped' by an »Asiatic tidal wave« were reinforced when several hundred Pakistani workers came to the border, seeking entry and employment after the immigration ban was instituted in the FR of Germany.[72] Thus, the Norwegian immigration ban of 1975 *with dispensation:*

1) used economic and cultural hegemonistic arguments;
2) operated on a dual exclusion policy of certain groups.

To this end, it created a »non-migrant« migrant category according to the growing capital needs of the oil sector, while *controlling* the further entry of »exotic«, »non-Christian«, »non-white« groups of foreign workers from developing countries.

V. FOREIGN WORKERS IN THE NORWEGIAN OIL SECTOR: »THE KUWAIT OF THE NORTH«

> I'm glad you're going to Kuwait, because you will learn many things there. The first thing you will learn is: money comes first, and then morals.
>
> Ghassan Kanafani
> *Men in the Sun*

»Non-migrant« migrants were imported to the North Sea by multinational oil companies, as part of their »own« foreign labour force. These groups of foreign workers were usually recruited in one country, received their work contracts in another, were shipped off to work in a third, while the company officials resided in yet a fourth country. The nature of such contract labour, irregardless of whether it occurs in the oil—producing Gulf region or on the Norwegian shelf, has been characterized as: nothing but 'rent-a-slave'; since the political/economic status of such workers is close to temporary chattel.[73]

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71 Said, ibid., pp. 59—60.

Several interesting examples of the relevance of these ideas and how they are manipulated for anti-immigrant campaigns are given by Castles. In France, for example, *neo-fascist* groups make racist slogans, claiming that »our religion is threatened with extinction, our religion with *subjection* to »Islam«. In the FR of Germany, Castles points out that »although there was prejudice and discrimination against Southern Europeans, at least they were *white* and *Christian*. Germans seem to perceive Turks as *alien* and *threatening*. Anti-Turkish feeling has deep historical roots, connected with *medieval struggles* between Christianity and Islam, and Turkish expansion westwards up to the 17th century. The defeat of the Turks before Vienna in 1683 is a major historical event in Germany, especially in 1983, the anniversary year«, p. 200.

72 Aud Korbøl, ibid.

73 Janet Abu-Lughod, »Urbanization and Social Change in the Arab World,« *Capital and Labour in the Urbanized World*, ed. John Walton, SAGE studies in Intrenational Sociology, vol. 31, 1985, p. 140.

The following case of Brown and Root, an American multinational versus approximately 2000 Spanish workers in the Statfjord oil fields, is one such documented example.[74] In 1978, the situation culminated in one of the more dramatic strikes in recent Norwegian history.

The Rotterdam Connection

Spanish labourers were primarily recruited for work in the North Sea directly from their villages in Galicia by illegal »work entrepreneurs«. From Galicia, they travalled to Rotterdam, where Brown and Root had its European headquarters. In certain bars in Rotterdam's harbour district, the workers would contact the firm's »personal co-ordinators«, who arranged the group contracts. In certain instances, fees ranging up to 400 US dollars were charged per work contract. Among other things, these contracts included clauses which bound the workers to complete silence regarding the company's activities, and allowed for instant dismissal in case of illness. Once in the North Sea, the almost hermetic isolation of the foreign workers, created favourable conditions for their further abuse and exploitation:

a) **Offshore**

On the oil platforms, the employers split up the Spanish and Norwegian crews. This standard tactic resulted in the Spanish workers receiving

- 4 dollars/hour for the same work that the Norwegian workers received 12 dollars/hour;
- no overtime compensation, while forced to work for up to 360 hours without time off;
- more seldom and shorter offshore leave;
- hazardous job operations which the Norwegian crews refused to undertake.

b) **Onshore**

The Spanish workers were isolated from Norwegian society in physically enclosed camps and from the Norwegian authorities in terms of health and social benefits. It was discovered that Brown and Root was deducting 30 percent from the workers' salaries, ostensibly for Norwegian state tax purposes. The Norwegian authorities, on the other hand, were not even aware of the workers' existence. Furthermore, since there was no official co-operation between Norway and Spain during Franco's regime, the Spanish workers, upon termination of work or forced dismissal in the North Sea, could not obtain unemployment or pension benefits in Spain.

[74] Augustin Asenjo, *Norsk Olje, Spansk Svette: Spanske arbeidere og amerikansk kapital i Nordsjøen* (Oslo: Pax Forlag A/S, 1979).
The number of these foreign workers is, in general, difficult to estimate. This is partly due to the high turnover rate of personnel and the organizational characteristics of the oil industry itself-particularly the large number of subcontractors employed and the widespread use of joint ventureships among the contractors themselves. For example, in one Norwegian oil refinery, it was estimated that between 30—40 contractors and sub-contractors were operating, each with its »own« non-Norwegian work force. The Norwegian company had agreements only with the 5 main contractors, and appeared to be uninterested in the relationships between the main contractors and the sub and sub-sub contractors (Swetland, ibid., p. 13). According to Aud Korbøl, there were 33 such »groups« or 1200 workers in 1975, while in 1976, there were 75 groups, with nearly 2000 workers. In 1974, foreigners represented 12% of the total labour force in the oil sectors, as opposed to 2% in the overall labour force. In Stavanger, the center of oil activity, there were more than 48 different nationalities employed in the oil sector at this time.

c) »Union« representation

In actuality, union representation was non-existent. On the one hand, Brown and Root had its own »union« which was primarily represented by the company's foremen. On the other hand, the Norwegian Oil and Petrochemical Union (NOPEF), which had initially supported group recruitment, a) was neither aware of the number of migrants, nor how many were organized in their own countries; b) did not have any real judicial authority over the foreign firms.

The strike, which was called by the Spanish workers in 1978 to demand compensation for tax money paid to the Norwegian authorities, ended in failure:

— the Norwegian authorities supported Brown and Root by sending out armed police to the oil platforms;
— NOPEF declared the strike illegal and stamped the workers as »reactionary« for demanding a return of state tax money;
— the Spanish workers were shipped out from the North Sea.

The state's lack of support for the foreign workers coincided with growing unemployment in the Norwegian shipyards. Backed by Norwegian demands for increased local influence and participation in the North Sea activities, thousands of shipyard workers were re-employed into the oil sector, replacing the foreign workres. The Spanish workers, prior to leaving, summed up their experiences in the following manner:

> Many of us have fought against Franco for many years. If that, which we have experienced in Norway, is what we have fought for, then our struggle was in vain.[75]

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS — TENDENCIES OF THE 1980's

The socio-economic policies of the traditional Keynesian welfare state have been significantly altered by the general world—wide re-organization of production. One response to the growing influence of both transnational capital and the transnational bourgeoisie[76], has been a shift from Keynesian state policies to »neo-liberal« or »new mercantilist« models.[77] These policies, while advocating increased investment abroad (e.g. the recycling of petrol dollars), have also contributed to: a) increasing privatization of social services and b) questioning the commitment to maintain high employment[78] on the national level.

In Norway, there has been a progressive deterioration in the viability of the non-oil sector and »in the ability of the Norwegian economy to cope with structural adjustment pressures which have emanated from the international economy«:[79]

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75 Augustin Asenjo, ibid., p. 8.
76 Carl-Ulrik Schierup, »The Immigrants and the Crisis«, *Acta Sociologica*, 1985 (28), 1:21—23.
77/78 Adne Cappelen et al., »Den norske modellen,« *Nordisk tidskrift for politisk ekonomi*, nr. 15/16, 1984, pp. 75—107.
According to Joan Robinson, *»new mercantilism«* is »part of the global neo-conservative reorientation of economic and social policies, whose main objective is to reinforce the competitive position of internationally targeted enterprises, making all other aims subsidiary to this focus on the world market« (cited in Dieter Läpple, ibid., p. 52).
79—81 »Country Problems and Strategies,« *The OECD Observer*, Nr. 33, March 1985, pp. 26—27.

— industrial production has been virtually stagnant for the last ten years;
— traditional sectors of the economy have become highly dependent on oil and gas revenues;
— the profitability and financial structure of the exposed (export) sector have been undermined by rising real labour costs.[80]

While massive government subsidies from oil and gas revenues have lessened the pains of restructuring, nonetheless, since the late 1970's, Norway has also shifted towards a »neo-liberal« policy in response to international economic pressures. Transfers to the private sector now account for over 60 percent of government outlays[81], while unemployment, which from 1945 till 1981 ranged between 1—2 percent, has increased to 4 percent since 1981. (Taking into account hidden unemployment, among categories such as youth and women, brings the figure closer to 8 percent of the total labour force (T. Koritzinsky).

Within this general framework of the »crisis of the welfare state«, the political climate in Western Europe is not favourably inclined towards social experiments such as integration policies.[82] In general, integration policies have tended to operate by selecting »able-bodied, skilled and ambitious migrants who are politically safe (together) with their families and stimulating them towards economic, cultural and even political integration or assimilation in the receiving society.«[83] However, with shifting policy priorities, even these foreigners become increasingly represented as »the principal strain«[84] on the overextended welfare state.

> To this end, the »foreigners« (the immigrants) ... are represented as ... the root of many evils. »Integration policy« is conceived as costly and burdensome, creating an »unsound mentality« of »parasitism«. Depending on from where and *against whom* criticism is directed, the assaults are phrased ... in more or less racist terms.[85]

In this regard, there has been a significant increase in the 1980's of Neo-Nazi activities in Norway, directed primarily at the settled »exotic« minorities. In their efforts to preserve the »purity of the Nordic race«, »anti-parasite« groups view as their primary goal the psychological and physical harrassment of the immigrant community. Their activities have included assault and slandering of immigrants (e.g. knifing of children); vandalizing shops and homes; distributing racist propaganda to schools, trade unions and individuals; and numerous bomb threats, especially to schools with large immigrant student populations. Their latest target was a mosque in Oslo, which was blown up in June of 1985.

While certainly the majority of the population does not condone these activities, it can be argued that concepts such as »homogenous society« indirectly validate a whole range of negative reactions directed against the »foreign« element. The increasing shift to »common sense« racism emphasizes that »the danger from immigration is that the alienness of the outsider cracks the homogenity of the insiders«.[86] Thus, the stress on the cultural differences of immigrant groups, implicit in the notion of »homogenity«, in subtle ways authorizes emotions of *hostility* expressed in the »us« — »they« division.

82—83 Carl-Ulrik Schierup, Ibid.
84 Castles, Stephen, »Racism and Politics in West Germany,« Ibid.
85 Carl-Ulrik Schierup, Ibid., pp. 30—31.
86 Martin Barker, *The New Racism* (London: Junction Books, 1981), p. 20.

As restructuring of the economy continues, the danger in Norway, as in the rest of Western Europe, is that the »flexible positional superiority« of the receiving society will more thoroughly incorporate such attitudes into future socio-economic policies — directed at strengthening the minority status of the immigrant communities. To this end, arbitrary »us« — »they« distinctions, reinforced by arguments of cultural hegemonism may once again find legitimation and take on a »new social significance«[87] for managing the present crisis of the welfare state.

SUMMARY

The paper examines from a historical perspective, certain socio-economic aspects of the indigenous Sami and foreign workers' situation in Norway. The discussion deals first with the implications of concepts such as »homogeneous society« and second, using Edward Said's notion of »flexible positional superiority«, analyzes the foreigner's relationship to the dominant Norwegian society.

In particular, the paper attempts to show that a combination of both economic interests and Western cultural hegemonistic attitudes have been used, historically and actually, in various ways to legitimize a) arbitrary designations of »foreign« or »migrant« categories; b) internal colonialism and a policy of *Norwegianization;* and c) control and exclusion of particular foreign groups from the society.

[87] Castles, ibid., 1984.



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

Prilog II
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N = 94 668

Priloge pripremila Sonja Podgorelec