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## YUGOSLAV CITIZENS IN FASCIST GERMANY

### SUMMARY

The number of Yugoslav citizens in Germany was on a constant increase after World War I (1925: 14,067; 1935: 17,258; 1939: 58,240). As a result of deportations that were a part of the fascist forced labor scheme during World War II, the number grew still further. In Germany between 1933 and 1939, Yugoslavia ranked among the leading countries of foreigners' origin. In relation to the population of the host country, the share of Yugoslavs living in the German Empire grew from 0.12 to 0.35%. They were concentrated in the Prussian provinces of the Rhein and Westphalia. The two held almost a third of all Yugoslav citizens up to 1939. In the big cities of the region concerned the number of Yugoslavs dropped in absolute terms and, consequently, as a share in the total population, although Yugoslavs represented a growing share of the foreign population in the same period of time.

Connected with its emergence, Lenin considered one of the peculiar features of imperialism to be »decreasing migration out of imperialist countries and the increasing migration (influx of workers and immigration) into these countries from under-developed ones with low wages« (7: 287). This »special kind of mass migration« (6: 447) founded in the capitalist economy was also to be distinctly observed in Germany since the end of the 19th century. Within the migration of labour forces to imperialistic Germany, Yugoslavs always had their place. The important study upon this theme by Kolar-Dimitrijević, based on Yugoslav sources, proceeds from the ascertainment that »the first larger-scale migration of Yugoslav seasonal workers to Germany was registered as early as in 1921« (3: 331+).<sup>1</sup> With this, the members of the Yugoslav population in association with the Danube Monarchy, which came to Germany already before and during World War I and were hardly statistically surveyed, remain unconsidered. This also holds true of the mostly Slovenian mine-worker colonies in the Rhein-Westphalian industrial area.

Foreign labour forces in the German Reich were employed on the basis of permissions from the German Labour Centre. According to their records, which did not include, to be sure, all incoming workers outside of Prussia, from 1924 to 1932 (with the exception of 1925 and the decline after 1931 linked to the world economic crisis), between 6,500 and 9,000 workers were permitted constantly every year (12). During the time between the two world wars the number of Yugoslav citizens in Germany rose significantly and continuously.

<sup>1</sup> The assertions of this fundamental work which follow are supplemented and made precise on further sources.

Table 1

*Yugoslav resident population in the German Reich, 1925, 1933 and 1939*  
(percentile increase; fraction of total foreign population)

	Yugoslavs	Increase		Total Foreign population	% Yugoslav
		number	%		
1925	14,067	—	—	957,096	1.5
1933	17,258	3,191	22.7	756,760	2.3
1939	58,240	40,982	237.5	1,019,895	5.7
(German territory 1937)	(32,707)	(15,449)	85.5	697,144	(4.7)

Source: *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches* (Statistics of the German Reich) vol. 401, pp. 387+; vol. 451, part 4, p. 51; vol. 552, part 5, pp. +

The increase from 1925 to 1933 was approximately 23 percent smaller than the 238 percent from 1933 to 1939. With this, however, possible inadequate data should be pointed out (v. 3: 332, note 4) and it should be considered that the data for 1939 included the annexed regions of Austria and Czechoslovakia. However, also after allowing for the Yugoslavs living in these territories, an increase of almost 90 percent is possible.

With this Yugoslavia moved upwards in the list of source countries of foreigners in Germany, and also the fraction of the migrating Yugoslavs in relation to the homeland population trebled, from 0.12 to 0.35 percent (5: app. tab. 2, 3). A foundational contract between Yugoslavia and Germany on the conditions for the recruitment, processing and engagement of foreign labourers was resolved on December 15, 1928 (10: 9). In connection with the effects of the crisis, on January 23, 1933, a »regulation concerning foreign workers« (11a: 26+) in Germany was enacted. This established an employment authorization for the employer and a work permit for the foreign worker as prerequisites for the intake of workers from foreign countries. The work permit was issued in two forms: an *Arbeitskarte* (work card) with a maximum validity of 12 months or a *Befreiungsschein* (exemption paper) on condition of a minimal ten-year stay in Germany. As a result of the crisis' effects on the work force market with more than six million Germans unemployed, the regulation presented the high point of a more restricted permission policy, but also simultaneously offered good possibilities for the adaptation to changing economic conditions and for the permanent supervision of foreign workers. In the framework of the German-Yugoslav Trade Agreement from May 1st, 1934 (11 b), a free exchange of workers between the two countries was provided for.

The years from establishment of the fascist dictatorship in January 1933, to about 1936, regarding the employment of foreigners, were characterized by a cautious turning away from the restrictive permission policy vis-à-vis foreign workers. The progressively more openly forced aggressive armament policy gave rise to a rapidly growing demand for work forces. This led to a spontaneous domestic migration, and also, in growing measures, in the framework of the fascist employment policy, to a forced domestic migration movement. A growing unfulfilled structural, and also more and more general domestic, demand for labour forces developed. Such a development resulted in a new stage in the employment of foreigners from 1936—37 onwards,

above all in connection with the so-called second Four Year Plan, a programme of forced preparation for war. Regarding the recruitment of foreign workers which, in the given situation, fell more and more imperatively into the field of view of the fascist employment officials, the fulfilment of the demand was also decidedly limited by the regime's precarious foreign currency exchange situation under war mobilization conditions. The employment of Yugoslav labour forces in Germany during the 1930s falls categorically into this domain.

After a corresponding principle decision was made by the delegate for the Four Year Plan, Hermann Göring, the departments concerned began working in the beginning of 1937 on the practical realization of the plan. In a discussion on February 5th, 1937 »Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, as well as Austria and Hungary were contemplated as recruiting areas... first of all.« It was also held to be true »that, especially in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, prospective recruitments could be executed with success.« Aspired agreements should »have been reachable with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Austria, as necessary on the basis of already existing migratory worker settlements with these lands« (PAF-a). The acute foreign currency exchange problems were also discussed, and shortly thereafter, newly emphasized (16 b). During the further treatment of these problems it was recorded in a subsequent meeting on March 22nd: »For Yugoslavia, where approximately 3,000 agricultural migratory workers of German origin could be recruited, everything depends on whether a way can be found to make available the foreign currencies for the transfer of savings, which is not possible at present« (PAF-c). Investigation resulted in the following: »The relations in Yugoslavia are particularly difficult in the current time period. Reliance on the German—Yugoslav Clearing Agreement for the transference of saved wages from 2,000 migratory workers is, with the situation of things, not yet possible.« After an illustration of details and analysis it was conclusively recorded that »the dispatch of a delegation to Belgrade to enable an agreement on the transfer of salary savings by means of clearing... (appear), therefore, at the current point in time without prospects« (PAF-d). Shortly thereafter the *Reichsanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung* (National Office for Labour Mediation and Unemployment Insurance) had to concisely report subordinately to the *Reichsarbeitsminister für Fragen des Arbeitseinsatzes* (National Minister for Questions on Labour Engagement), and then its president reported to its superior ministry in connection with the Four Year Plan apparatus: »The intake of agricultural migratory workers from Yugoslavia must be given up, regarding transfer possibilities and based on a proclamation from the National and Prussian Economic Minister« (PAF-e). An intermediate solution appeared to be searched for in the recruitment of long-term workers, as the *Reichsstelle für Devisenbewirtschaftung* (National Agency for Foreign Currency Exchange) noted in the end of July 1937, on the recruitment of such long-term active forces »because an agreement on the transfer of migratory workers' earnings with Yugoslav government agencies had not yet materialized.« During the deliberations between government commissions from both sides at the end of September in Dubrovnik the problem appeared anew in the daily agenda, and it was again recorded that »to date, no acceptable transference possibilities have been found« (BAK-a), but agreement had been reached, »that sufficient payments for this purpose along the lines of the German—Yugoslav Clearing Agreement could be afforded« (BAK-b). Then, in the end of October, a corresponding piece of information

to the chief presidents of finances followed to »remit to Yugoslavia on a larger scale than before the current workers' earnings and the already existing savings of the long-term and migratory workers« (BAK-c). Such possibilities found their roots in secret talks in April 1936 in Zagreb, and in July of the same year in Berlin, and were made precise and revived in October 1938 and June 1939 (BAK-d:200, 236 +).

At the same time as the efforts to make a salary transfer possible, the Yugoslav consulate in Düsseldorf turned to the president of the *Reichsanstalt* and, because of surplus labour forces in Yugoslavia, testified to immense interest in the employment of Yugoslav seasonal agricultural workers in Germany, and pleaded for the »most preferential treatment of this concern possible,« last but not least because of the »always-developing closer friendly economic ties« between both countries (PAF-f).

In the beginning of 1938, after Yugoslavs were employed in 1937 (above all in the Mecklenburg agricultural areas) (BAK-e) the problem acutely confronted the fascist leadership. On January 19th, 1938, Secretary of State Friedrich Syrup estimated the demand to be 75,000 migratory workers and 160,000 long-term workers, of which numbers it was hoped 4,000 migratory and 1,000 long-term workers could be recruited from Yugoslavia (PAF-g). The minutes of a top meeting on the Four Year Plan recorded on this: »From Yugoslavia ten-twelve thousand agricultural workers could be taken over; to-date only 5,000 of these could be insured foreign currency-wise (in the past year only 2,000 workers were taken in from there)« (BAK-f). A corresponding agreement was met only concerning these 5,000, far below Yugoslavia's supply possibilities and Germany's demand for labour forces (3:336). Again it appeared that a significant fraction of these agricultural workers were placed in Mecklenburg (ZS + A-a).

For the year 1938 there existed a dependable activity report from the *Reichsanstalt* on the »intake of foreign agricultural workers,«<sup>2</sup> which also contained statements to Yugoslavia. The figures already mentioned above were introductorily quoted, and it was recorded that they succeeded »in gaining a larger number of workers for employment in German agriculture.« A border dispatch office was established for Yugoslavia in Passau. For questions about the transfer of salaries, the *Reichsanstalt* distributed an instruction booklet in German, Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian. Efforts to recruit foreigners of German nationality to work as farm-hands for rural firms were confronted by difficulties also in the case of those from Yugoslavia, as they »often rejected assignment there because of unfavourable working conditions and smaller possibilities for earning.« It was discussed in a particular region of Yugoslavia that the original output contingent of 4,000 migratory workers and 1,000 farm-hands rose to 6,000 and 4,000, respectively, because of improved transfer possibilities. From these numbers, 6,202 migratory workers and 2,837 farm-hands were enlisted. The Drava and Danube Banats were established as feeder-regions ensuing the discussions. From the German point of view the cooperation with the Yugoslav employment mediators was formed without problems. Difficulties came about only through the fact that not enough single, younger workers were available. With consent from the Yugoslav Ministry of Social Policy and Health, labourers of German nationality were also recruited outside of the agreed feeder-regions. Opposition to this method

<sup>2</sup> AAN-c, especially pages 2+ and 12+ report on the intake of foreign agricultural workers in 1938, October 1938. Quotations following originate from this source. See also: PAF-h.

from Yugoslav police officials became progressively stronger, »allegedly because of the nation's own need for agricultural labour forces, but in reality in order to prevent a mass emigration of German nationals.« Slovenian workers were particularly positively judged regarding their performance. According to the view of recruiting agents it would be possible to enlist twelve-thirteen thousand agricultural workers from Yugoslavia in 1939.

Such expectations were also reflected in the German press. The newspaper *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, for example, reported in 1939 on 13,000 planned agricultural workers in Germany as opposed to 5,000 in 1938 (ZStA-b). However, conferences on the engagement of Yugoslav agricultural workers first took place in late February 1939 in Belgrade (ZStA-c).<sup>3</sup>

In the modification of the agreement from December 15th, 1928 two agreements were reached, each concerning migratory workers and longterm agricultural workers. Germany's wish for 12,000 workers for 1936 (7,000 migratory and 5,000 long-term workers), was met first of all by the Yugoslav side with a promise of 10,000 workers. The transcript of the deliberation contained resolutions on questions concerning wages and working hours (which were regulated according to German provisions), arranged for the administration of passports and welfare, and granted Yugoslav delegates the right to »occasionally look into the state of Yugoslav workers through visits to the workplaces.« Because of the given food situation in Germany the duty-free import of bacon by Yugoslav workers was allowed. A greater remittance possibility concerning migratory workers could be reached. In order to ensure the fitness of the labour forces, further »guidelines for the medical pre-examination of Yugoslav agricultural workers« were agreed to on German initiative. As a foundation for workers' legal relations, work contracts were prepared in which essential points for all bilateral settlements of the *Reichanstalt* agreed. The long-term workers were given equality with the German agricultural workers, and with migratory workers the same principle was adhered to, however more precisely defined through further remarks.

With a decree from the National Economic Minister on May 15th, 1939, a monthly transference of 40 Reichsmarks for migratory workers and 35 Reichsmarks for long-term workers to a total of 400 and 350 Reichsmarks (respectively) was allowed (BAK-g). The use of a 10 Reichsmarks allowance of tax-free income on departure in the form of hard currency was formally prohibited, however, internally the border custom points were privately instructed »in the export of smaller hard currency sums to a total amount of RM 3 by Yugoslav workers (to not) make trouble (BAK-h). This maximum limit was then raised in November to the general normal RM 10 (BAK-i).

Until early September 1939 no legal remittance possibilities existed for commercial workers (ZStA-d). On September 8th, this category of labour forces was granted the same possibilities as the agricultural migratory workers (BAK-k).

The situation of Yugoslav workers in Germany is, from the Marxist—Leninist point of view, to be seen »not only as the situation of their wages, but as the totality of the conditions of their exploited lives at the mercy of capital« (4:1). The situation of the workers, determined by the state and marked by the state of production relations through the totality of the political, economic, social, legal and spiritual-cultural conditions of social life, were characterized in view of this background through such elements, among

<sup>3</sup> Quotations following also originate from this source.

others, as working conditions, cultural and educational levels, health conditions, nutrition and living relations (v. 1:285). Loud voices were already to be heard in 1937, which called attention to the discrepancy between promises (that is, formal pledges) and the realities found in Germany. Newspapers quoted reports from Yugoslav workers from Germany: »The workers, who took up work in Germany with joy, have met with great disappointment. In many cases the employers have not carried through with the agreed conditions. They have reduced wages on their own authority, and other conditions contained in the contracts have been changed.« Contrary to given insurances often separately inserted, they had to »work in accord and were so done in that they went 'to their knees.'« Overtime was not paid. »For two months they (ate) nothing but potatoes. But the worst they are not allowed to send money home« (PAF-i). Even after allowing for a certain amount of journalistic exaggeration the picture is bleak. During the time that followed, progress concerning the transfer question and the provision of foodstuffs — as mentioned — was achieved. The situation for commercial workers, however, remained problematic in 1938 and also in 1939. They were confronted by the danger of »not being allowed to send their hard-earned money home, which was actually the idea behind traveling abroad« (AHZ-a).

In August great propaganda was reported, »in which best conditions and especially high daily wages had been promised. In reality it meant: All these workers, including those from other countries, work(ed) under rather harsh conditions according to the difficulty of the work. The working day often amount(ed) to 9½ to ten hours. The weekly salary, deducting expenditures for food, health insurance and similar items, amount(ed) to an average of 20—25 Marks. Often 200 or more people (had to) sleep in the same room in work dorms.« Especially problematic in this connection was that most of the illegally immigrated workers had no labour contract, and, therefore, »whatever they (did), it (was) not possible to improve their situation or, worst of all, to send their wages home« (AHZ-b). Such an estimation, however, was also faced by other observations. German customs officials suspiciously watched the increased export of valuable industrial wares and trade goods by Yugoslav labourers and established the cause as being, »these people have earned very well here, so they still receive today 50 to 70 RM weekly in cash; they are very easily satisfied and especially frugal. The Yugoslav commercial workers had to-date no legal possibility to send money to their relatives in the homeland« (BAK-k).

Next to concrete work-, wage- and living conditions, one must also keep in mind a completely fundamental aspect. For the concrete historical situation, the existence of a fascist dictatorship in Germany cannot be forgotten that the most brutal political, economic and spiritual subjugation of the working class and the other labourers accompanied the accelerated preparation for war. Moreover, under these conditions an intensification of the nationalistic and racist ideology and policy came into play, especially towards foreigners.

Fascism, as a form of exertion of power in imperialism, aimed not only for repression of the workers' movement but also for its destruction. Under the conditions of fascism, in face of widely-spread broken up workers' movement organizations and the installation of fascist compulsory organizations, a demand for the incorporation of foreign labour forces into such institutions could not be thought of. Efforts on the part of the fascists in power were directed, above all, towards the so-called German workers front — a special organization for the desorientation, secret surveillance, terrorization and ideo-

logic influence of the working class and the *Reichsnährstand* — a state-monopolistic organization which, as a pseudo-corporate »self-governing agency,« served, above all, the political and ideological indoctrination of its members and the preparation of the land economy for the war. This did not hinder the fact that, according to the essentials of fascist racism, the traditional imperialistic concern was strengthened to use the import of labour forces to bring about a division of the working class. However, the particular capital valuation conditions in fascism, characterized by state terror and the subsequent possibilities for an increase and misappropriation of overtime, worked against this in that foreigners lost their function in the industrial reserve army more and more. The concrete manifestations and effects of the fascist dictatorship reduced to a minimum for this case of imperialistic power play the possible progressive effects of labour force migration in the form of a consciousness development through contact with a strong and politically experienced workers' movement from the source-land and through the meeting with progressive production methods which were principally called to attention by the classic Marxist—Leninist authors. In connection with this the heightened tendency in the '30s to employ foreign labour forces in greater masses in non-qualified, manual and physically hard work areas should be considered. The illegally-fighting, most politically conscious fraction of the working class had to alter the priorities of the anti-fascist fight after 1933. International fundamental positions of the united fight of German and foreign class-comrades were not given up; the issues, under actual fight conditions were modified. This entire connection certainly explains a great deal why instances of unified action between German and foreign workers in this time period are only seldom to be found in sources. On the other hand it is clear that the appropriate branches of the fascist repression apparatus followed the engagement of foreigners with great attention and principle mistrust because politically harmful effects on the long-oppressed and mass-disciplined German population were possible through the fact that foreigners, though exposed to the economic migration surge, were taken from non-fascist, although often authoritarian, countries. With the beginning of the strengthened labour force import, plans were made »to create transit camps for the investigation of political reliability« (BAK-1) and the National Minister of the Interior arranged that the workers coming to Germany in fulfilment of the Four Year Plan« (should be) included and further, according to opportunity, checked (to see) if they are politically unobjectionable and suitable for employment in Germany« (PAF-j). Foreigners, for example, had to leave Germany because their »political opinions were viewed as dangerous to the state« (2:83c) and there were prominent fears that »the local national comrades (would be) too easily influenced by the political 'subversion'« should labour forces be taken in from non-fascist countries (2:788).

Attempts by foreign workers to improve their working and living conditions, through strikes and other actions, had direct political relevance for the fascist regime. Because partial results were produced by the fascists' concentrated efforts to oppress and terrorize the working class in connection with their ideological corruptive and disorienting attempts, the expression of opinions by foreigners had to be seen as irksome and dangerous.

Thus, as positive conscious-altering effects under certain assumptions through contact with the homeland working class came into play, this was also true for influencing attempts from the ruling class in the receiving country. Here it must be realized that the fear of the infiltration of revolutionary

thinking from wage-earning immigrants determined not only the regime's policy of oppression, but also its manipulation efforts concerning the foreigners. The efforts to propagandize fascist thinking had indirect and direct effects on the foreigners through their German work comrades, who had already been longer influenced by this opinion manipulation and were largely convinced. Fascist propaganda could still be supported through the concealed effects of the discrepancy in a few material living conditions between Germany, as the country of origin. In many source countries the dangers linked to this were correctly recognized and presented relatively early. Even the Yugoslav Interior Ministry only wanted to give permission to work in Germany to such workers »who were correctly politically and nationally oriented and would not be influenced by national-socialist propaganda« (AHZ-c).

The fundamental concern of the state-monopolistic imperialistic rule, and with this also the fascist dictatorship, was on the one hand to promote a frictionless exploitation of capital through the employment of foreigners, and on the other hand to not endanger its long-term general safeguarding through a destabilization of interior security.

The concrete development of the results of Yugoslav labour forces migrating to Germany, based on German statistical records, presents itself as follows.

Table 2

*Yugoslavs in the German Reich, 1933 and 1939*

(According to economic divisions, wage earners and independent tradeless workers; change in percentage since 1933 in parentheses)

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
1933	490	4,563	941	332	628	6,954	2,480	9,434
1939	16,771	14,777	3,047	1,434	2,122	38,151	4,326	42,477
	+ (3,323)	(224)	(224)	(332)	(238)	(449)	(74)	(350) %
1933	7	65	14	5	9	100%		
1939	44	39	8	4	5	100%		

I Agriculture, animal breeding, gardening, forestry and hunting, fishing

II Industry and craft guilds

III Trade and traffic

IV Municipal service and private service

V Household service

VI Total I—V

VII Independent tradeless workers

VIII Total of wage earners and independent tradeless workers

Source: *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches*, vol. 451, part 4, pp. 76+, vol. 552, part 5, pp. 64—65; percentages calculated

Based on the figures of resident population (see Table 1) the number of wage earners rose from around 7,000 to more than 38,000. This corresponds to an increase of almost 450 percent, compared to an increase of only 74 percent of independent tradeless workers. From a structural aspect it was unmistakable that the largest increase was to be seen in economic division I (agriculture, etc.), whose figure rose from seven to 44 percents from 1933 to 1939. Simultaneously the dominance of economic division II (industry and craft guilds) was reduced from 65 to 39 percent.



Yugoslav labourers in Germany with work cards or exemption papers numbered 5,126 in the period from April 1, 1935, to March 31, 1936, 6,208 between April 1, 1936 and March 31, 1937, and 9,633 between April 1, 1937 and March 31, 1938 (PAS-a; ZS + A-e).

These figures encompass the transformation period in the mass-employment of foreigners and are related to workers who were granted work cards or exemption papers. The relatively small increase from 1935-36 to 1936-37 could probably be explained by the more exact inclusion of labour forces on hand, (5:270 +) while the distinct increase from 1936-37 to 1937-38 may be seen as a result of the measures introduced in Spring 1937.

Table 3

*Yugoslav labourers in the German Reich, 1938*

(According to regional employment office districts, German territory 1937; April 1, 1937-March 31, 1938; labourers who possessed work cards or exemption papers)

Reg. employ. office distr.	number	female	work card	exemption paper
Ostpreußen	12	5	—	12
Schlesien	80	38	17	63
Brandenburg	806	372	568	238
Pommern	445	93	424	21
Nordmark	688	211	561	127
Niedersachsen	218	73	31	187
Westfalen	2,109	432	34	2,075
Rheinland	2,619	695	130	2,489
Hessen	71	23	14	57
Mitteldeutschland	941	375	881	60
Sachsen	239	115	50	189
Bayern	742	300	409	333
Südwestdeutschland	663	321	502	161
German Reich	9,633	3,053	3,621	6,012
of those:				
agricultural workers	3,469	1,241	3,051	417
industrial workers	5,660	1,565	434	5,226
clerks	505	247	136	569

Source: *Zentrales Staatsarchiv der DDR (ZS+A)*, Potsdam Reichskanzlei, Film 19663

Here the regional division of active Yugoslav workers who possessed work permission in 1937-38 is made clear, including information on the general agriculture and industry distribution. The regional subdivision corresponds to the administrative districts and is therefore not comparable to the general governing structure. After this the crucial points of the employment of Yugoslav labour forces lay in the administrative districts Westphalia and Rheinland, where approximately half of all Yugoslavs were active. The figure for women, 38 percent, was under the national average. The ratio of agricultural workers (36 percent) to industrial workers (59 percent) deviated from the national average (approx. 36 and 41 percent, respectively (5: tab. 17) with the

industrial workers greatly. The fraction of clerks was also visibly under the national average, with 5 percent, as opposed to the current norm of 14 percent, (5: tab. 22).

Many of these occurrences may be traced back to the concentration in the Rhein-Westphalian industrial area. The ratio of work card to exemption paper-holders was 38 to 62 percent; those with exemption papers numbered slightly more than the national average and exhibited a distinct predominance of Yugoslavs already active in Germany for longer periods of time.

Table 4

*Yugoslav agricultural labourers in the German Reich, 1938*  
According to regional employment office districts (German territory 1937)

Reg. employ. office distr.	of these		farmhands
	number	migratory workers	
Ostpreußen	—	—	—
Schlesien	94	—	94
Brandenburg	934	119	815
Pommern	2,091	2,091	—
Nordmark	3,321	2,006	1,315
Niedersachsen	1,137	1,137	—
Westfalen	—	—	—
Rheinland	—	—	—
Hessen	4	—	4
Mitteldeutschland	195	193	2
Sachsen	12	12	—
Bayern	245	156	89
Südwestdeutschland	518	518	—
German Reich	9,039	6,202	2,837

Source: *Archiwum Akt Nowych* (AAN), Warsaw, MSZ, № 9703

An overview exclusively on Yugoslavian agricultural workers supplements the previous tabulations. Most of the total figure, almost 37 percent of 9039, were in the Nordmark administrative district, and three fourths were employed in the areas of Nordmark, Pommerania and Lower Saxony.

Table 5

*Yugoslav labourers in Ruhr-mining, 1933, 1935 and 1937*  
(October each year; according to number, fraction of total crew and fraction of foreigners)

Year.	Number	Total crew	Foreign workers
1933	996	0.46	20.28
1935	1,154	0.48	21.63
1937	1,829	0.60	21.63

Source: *Zentrales Staatsarchiv der DDR* (ZS+A), Potsdam, DAF, AWI, Glückauf, Jan. 22, 1938

Very specific information is to be found on mining in the Ruhr area. According to this the number of Yugoslavs employed here rose from 996 in 1933 to 1,829 in 1937.

Table 6

*Yugoslav in the German Reich, 1939\**

According to job-division, job-level and sex,  
German territory on May 17th, 1939 including the annexed areas in Austria and Czechoslovakia, excluding Memel territory.

	I	m.	II	m.	III	m.	IV	m.
independents	605	465	555	451	582	468	110	59
w/helping family	.383	357	43	18	120	22	49	9
clerks	27	24	286	263	1,197	566	80	70
workers	14,722	8,995	12,745	11,618	48	21	1.87	504
total	16,737	9,841	13,629	12,350	1,947	1,077	1,325	642
independents	3.6		4.1		30.0		8.3	
w/helping family	8.2		0.3		6.1		3.6	
clerks	0.2		2.1		61.4		6.0	
workers	88.0		93.5		2.5		82.1	
total	100		100		100		100	
workers	45.7		39.6		0.1		3.4	
total	43.9		35.7		5.1		3.5	

  

	V	m.	VI	m.	VII	m.	VIII	m.
independents	155	108	8	—	3	3	2,010	1,554
w/helping family	17	1	—	—	—	—	1,611	407
clerks	693	256	8	1	41	36	2,332	1,216
workers	168	99	1,959	17	1,469	1,025	32,198	22,279
total	1,033	464	1,967	18	1,513	1,064	38,151	25,456
independents	15.0		—		0.2		5.3	
w/helping family	1.6		—		—		4.2	
clerks	67.1		0.4		2.7		6.1	
workers	16.3		99.6		97.1		84.4	
total	100		100		100		100	
workers	0.5		6.1		4.6		100	
total	2.7		5.2		3.9		100	

I agricultural, forestry and fishing occupations

II industrial and craft guild occupations

III merchant occupations

IV traffic, gastronomic and hotel occupations

V insurance, legal care, education and health care occupations

VI domestic servants

VII storage, transport and sanitation service occupations

VIII total I—VII

m. males

Source: *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches*, vol. 552, part 5, p. 82; percentages calculated

For 1939 assertions on the structure, based on classification, can be further specified into job-divisions and job-levels. When one considers the 38,151 wage earners under the exclusion of tradeless independents, the prominent fraction of workers (85 percent) comes particularly to light; in the case of agricultural trades the share of workers was 88 percent, and with industrial and craft guild trades even higher (93,5 percent). These two trade divisions made up almost 80 percent of the total figure of wage earners, thus over 85 percent of Yugoslavs were employed in these areas (agriculture 45.7 percent, industry and craft guilds 39,6 percent). The fraction of men exhibited a significant numerical difference of 30 percent in these two groups-agriculture, 61 percent and industry and craft guilds, 91 percent. This is explained by the greater employability of women in agriculture.

Table 7

*Yugoslav in the German Reich, 1939*  
According to age-group, sex and marital status

age group	number	male
under six	3,345	1,698
7-10	2,415	1,222
11-14	2,697	1,360
15-16	1,732	858
17-18	2,679	1,399
19-20	3,322	1,639
21	885	397
22-25	3,854	2,158
26-30	8,386	5,494
31-35	6,742	4,300
36-40	5,546	3,488
41-45	4,175	2,365
46-50	3,001	1,554
51-55	2,626	1,264
56-60	2,143	956
61-65	1,782	804
over 65 years	2,902	1,293
total	58,240	32,269
single	33,002	18,826

Source: *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches*, vol. 552, part 5, p. 57)

The age structure of the resident population in 1939 offers additional information on the wage-earning activities of Yugoslavs, 57 percent belonged to the especially capable age-group from 19 to 45.

Table 8

*Yugoslav in the German Reich, 1939*

German territory on May 17th, 1939 including the annexed regions in Austria and Czechoslovakia, excluding Memel territory

region, district	number	male	female
<i>Preußen</i>	21,701	11,781	9,920
Ostpreußen	71	52	19
Stadt Berlin	817	411	406
Brandenburg	1,002	567	435
Pommern	2,290	1,244	1,046
Grenzmark Posen-Westpr.	320	206	114
Schlesien	559	365	194
Sachsen	658	475	383
Schlewig-Holstein	1,176	846	330
Hannover	1,086	559	526
Westfalen	6,186	3,274	2,912
Hessen-Nassau	210	118	92
Rheinprovinz	7,409	3,838	3,571
Hohenzoller. Lande	38	32	6
<i>Bayern</i>	4,309	3,458	851
<i>Sachsen</i>	935	520	415
<i>Württemberg</i>	2,241	1,597	644
<i>Baden</i>	558	313	245
<i>Thüringen</i>	225	161	64
<i>Hessen</i>	81	51	30
<i>Hamburg</i>	235	126	109
<i>Mecklenburg</i>	1,693	935	758
<i>Oldenburg</i>	63	33	30
<i>Braunschweig</i>	375	157	218
<i>Bremen</i>	49	25	24
<i>Anhalt</i>	43	22	21
<i>Lippe</i>	33	17	16
<i>Schaumburg-Lippe</i>	3	2	1
<i>Saarland</i>	109 (32.707)	57	52
Reichsgau Wien	3,367	1,314	2,053
Niederdonau	1,343	666	677
Oberdonau	396	226	170
Steiermark	14,524	7,647	6,877
Kärnten	4,457	2,425	2,032
Salzburg	277	133	144
Tirol-Vorarlberg	441	208	233
Sudetenland	728 (25.533)	395	387
German Reich	58,240	32,269	25,971

Source: *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches*, vol. 552, part 5, pp. 9+

25,533 people, almost 44 percent of the total number of Yugoslav citizens in 1939, resided in the then-existing *Reichsgauen* in Austria and Czechoslovakia. Of these, 57 percent alone lived in Steiermark. Among the Reich's regions, the Rhein province and Westphalia were the fullest. Almost 42 percent of all so-called »Old Reich« Yugoslav residents lived there in 1939. Bavaria, Pommern and Württemberg followed in the list of sojourn areas. The ratio of men to women was 55:45.

Table 9

*Yugoslav in large cities in the German Reich, 1939*

German territory on May 17th, 1939 including the annexed areas in Austria and Czechoslovakia, excluding Memel territory

city	population	foreigners	fraction	Yugoslavs	fraction of Yugoslavs to foreigners
Berlin	4,338,756	62,240	1.43	817	1.3
Bochum	305,485	1,870	0.61	227	12.1
Dortmund	542,261	3,673	0.67	756	20.6
Düsseldorf	541,410	8,089	1.49	228	2.8
Duisburg	434,646	12,017	2.76	1,973	16.4
Essen	666,743	5,908	0.18	917	15.5
Gelsenkirchen	317,568	3,058	0.96	550	17.9
Hamburg	1,711,877	16,571	0.97	235	1.4
München	829,318	9,443	1.14	1,405	14.9
Oberhausen	191,842	3,337	1.74	629	20.7
Stuttgart	458,426	3,556	0.78	237	6.7
Graz	207,747	7,246	3.49	3,669	50.6
Wien	1,929,976	64,782	3.36	3,367	5.2

Source: *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches*, vol. 552, part 5, pp. 36+

One peculiarity is the high concentration of Yugoslavs in certain large cities. Quantitatively Duisburg and Munich contained the most. Of greater interest, however, is the fact that Yugoslavs constituted extremely high shares of the foreign population in the following order: Oberhausen, Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen, Duisburg, Essen, Munich and Bochum. With the exception of Munich, these cities are all located in the Rhein-Westphalian industrial area.

The established (that is, calculated) statistics call for a report on the whole scope of the employment of Yugoslavs in Germany in the 1930s. The figures from the *Reichsanstalt* differed obviously according to seasonally active or Yugoslav labour forces in Germany for longer periods of time. In the population and trade census of 1933 and 1939 all existing persons were included, without considering such subdivisions. Under this aspect the figures in table 4 are significant in that, especially in agriculture, a high fraction of work card holders (newly taken-in labour forces) were shown, while the opposite is indicated for industrial workers, where the longer-term residents with exemption papers prevail. This trend is emphasized by the values given for agricultural workers in table 3, where a further significant increase is recognizable. This tendency is further emphasized by the 1939 census, as the number of comparable agricultural workers rose significantly more. The differences between the figures from the census and data from the *Reichsanstalt* are, according to the aforementioned perceptions, probably due to the greater dependability of the census data opposed to the survey by employment officials which first became more reliable during the '30s. Sources also attribute this increase to illegal recruitment. In May 1939 the National Labour Ministry turned to its

conversation partner in the Ministry for Social Policy, Fedor Aranicki, and mentioned a series of cases in which »officials of German firms undertook efforts in Yugoslavia for the recruitment of industrial workers,« and »Yugoslav workers attempted to find their own ways into the Reich« (AHZ-d, e). Often-articulated indications of illegal entrance determine that the figures presented are minimum values in each case« (v. 5:72t, 291t). The assumption of an even higher number of Yugoslav labour forces is also probable. Examples linked to this are: The population census in 1939 reported the number of Yugoslav residents in German territory to be 58,240, of which 4,309 were in Bavaria; in a Yugoslav report on the Ban Administration in Zagreb it was recorded that »a large concentration of our workers in Munich, Salzburg and surrounding areas... is estimated at 10,000—15,000« (AHZ-f); a German source reported: »since February 1939 a great number of Yugoslav workers have come to Germany illegally (without going through the employment office)... In the Munich-Upper Bavaria Gau alone 70,000, and in German territory altogether 200,000 were reported to have been active« (BAK-M). Even considering a critical evaluation of such data and estimations, they corroborate the acceptance of a significantly higher number of Yugoslav labour forces in Germany than that which is found in statistics. In spite of this limitation, these statistics are good starting points for elaboration on trends and for structural assertions. In summary it must be re-emphasized that the already historical migration of labour forces from Yugoslavia to Germany followed the restrictive measures caused by the crisis in the early '30s and then rapidly increased through the growing demand for workers connected with the intensive preparation for war after 1937. Linked to the economic migration force, due to economic and social conditions in the homeland, this also led 10,000 Yugoslavs into fascist Germany until 1939.

The situation of Yugoslav people in Germany, mostly wage earners, was determined by the effects of a fascist dictatorship. The traditional restrictions in the area of working and living conditions were more prominent under these circumstances. The economic migration force worked in such a way, however, that the people going to Germany saw no other possibility than to take on this oppression.

Objectively, the exploitation of Yugoslav labourers also contributed to the preparation of the fascist German economy for World War II.

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AAN *Archiwum Akt Nowych* (New File Archives), Warsaw.

- a) Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, № 9703, folio 38+

AHZ *Arhiv Hrvatske*, Zagreb.

- a) Savska Banovina — SB fr. II D2 № 2908, folio 218 (Ministry for Social Policy and Health to Ban Administration, National Security Dept., Zagreb, June 2. 1939);
- b) SB fr. II D2, № 2908 folio 140+ (report of the Ban Administration, Aug. 12. 1939);
- c) SB B17/1938. № 5080, unnum. memorandum of the Interior Ministry, Aug. 12. 1937);
- d) SB fr. III D2 № 2908, folio 15 (National Employment Ministry to Ministry for Social Policy, May 23. 1939);
- f) SB fr. II D2 № 2908, folio 140 (report of the Ban Administration »The Situation of our Workers in Germany«, Aug. 12. 1939)

BAK *Bundesarchiv Koblenz* (Federal Archives, Koblenz).

- a) R 2 № 5907, folio 11 (National Agency for Foreign Currency Exchange to the chief presidents of finance, July 31, 1937);
- b) № 14138, folio 148 (record of Yugoslav-German government deliberations on Sept. 29. 1937, Oct. 4. 1937);
- c) № 5907, folio 20;
- d) № 14138, folio 167;
- e) NSD 4 Economic Commission NSDAP (NSGW/P), № 14, folio 5 (monthly report of the »Gau« economic adviser, Aug. 3. 1937);
- f) R 26 IV, № 4, folio 42, (protocol of the first discussion on economic questions, Feb. 10. 1938);
- g) R 2, № 5907, folio 67, circular 65/39, May 15, 1939;
- h) R 2, № 5907, folio 62, National Economic Minister to National Finance Minister, May 15, 1939;
- i) R 2, № 5907, folio 112, National Finance Minister, Oct. 14, 1933;
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- k) R 2, № 5907, folio 118 (Customs Agency Munich to Foreign Currency Agency Berlin, Sept. 23. 1939);
- l) R 26 IV, № 5, folio 161 (protocol of the 14th meeting of the General Four Year Plan Council, April 8. 1937);
- m) R 2, № 5907, folio 118 (Customs Agency Munich to Foreign Currency Agency Berlin, Sept. 23. 1939)

PAF *Political Archives of the Foreign Ministry*, Bonn.

- a) RV 21/1, unnum., (records of the conference on Feb. 5, 1937, Feb. 10, 1937);
- b) National and Prussian Economic Minister on delegates for the Four Year Plan, Feb. 2. 1937;
- c) RV 21/2, unnum., (comments on the conference on March 22. 1937, March 23. 1937);
- d) National and Prussian Economic Minister on delegates for the Four Year Plan, March 3. 1937;
- e) President of the Reichsanstalt (National Office for Labour Mediation and



Unemployment Insurance) to the Minister of Employment, May 24, 1937;  
f) RV 21/2 unnum. (Yugoslav Consulate Düsseldorf to Reichsanstalt president, Feb. 16. 1937);  
g) RV 21/2, unnum. (notes on discussion of Jan. 19. 1938, Feb. 2. 1938);  
g) RV 21/4, unnum. (Reichsanstalt to the State Dept., Nov. 24. 1938);  
i) RV 21/3, unnum. (German Consulate Zagreb to State Dept., Aug. 9. 1937, outline »Jutro«, June 2. 1937 — transcript);  
j) RV 21/2 unnum. (circular of the National and Prussian Interior Ministry, April 27. 1937)

PAS *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes* (Political Archives of the State Department, Bonn)  
a) RV 6a/6, 7/7

ZStA *Zentrales Staatsarchiv der DDR*, Potsdam (Central Nation Archives of the GDR, Potsdam).  
a) Reich's Press Archives Confederation, № 4095, folio 38c (farming in Mecklenburg, June 10, 1938);  
b) Reich's Press Archives Confederation, №4095 (Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, Jan. 19. 1938);  
c) Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Workers' Front), Scientific labour Institute (newspaper clippings coll., data on the discussions from Feb. 24—27, 1939)  
d) Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Workers' Front), Scientific Labor Institute (newspaper clippings coll., data on the discussions on Feb. 29, 1939);  
e) Film 19663

## JUGOSLAVENSKI GRAĐANI U FAŠISTIČKOJ NJEMAČKOJ

### SAŽETAK

Broj jugoslavenskih građana u Njemačkoj bio je u neprestanom porastu od prvoga svjetskog rata (14.067 godine 1925; 17.258 godine 1935; 58.240 godine 1939.). Kao rezultat deportacija koje su bile dio fašističkog programa prisilnog rada za vrijeme drugoga svjetskog rata, taj je broj još više porastao. Između 1933. i 1939. Jugoslavija bijaše jedna od vodećih zemalja po broju stranaca u Njemačkoj. U odnosu na populaciju zemlje domaćina udio Jugoslavena koji su živjeli u bivšem Njemačkom Reichu porastao je od 0,12 do 0,35%. Oni su bili koncentrirani u pruskim pokrajinama Westfaliji i Rajni, u kojima se do 1939. nalazila gotovo trećina svih jugoslavenskih građana. U velikim gradovima te regije broj Jugoslavena opao je u apsolutnom smislu, pa stoga i kao udio ukupnog stanovništva, iako su Jugoslaveni u istom razdoblju predstavljali udio inozemne populacije u porastu.